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Utah Code Ann. § 76-51-1 (1953) ---------------------------------- 1 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES CUMMINGS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
12408 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by the defendant-appellant, James 
Cummings, from a conviction for robbery. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was convicted pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-51-1 (1953) at a jury trial in the District Court 
of the Third Judicial District, the Honorable Joseph G. 
Jeppson, presiding. The appellant was sentenced to an 
indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison as provided 
by law for the crime of robbery. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the judgment of the 
district court should be affirmed and that the appellant 
should be retained in custody at the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts set forth in the appellant's 
brief is accurate and a further statement will not be made 
by the respondent except as necessary in presenting its 
argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
A CLAIMED VIOLATION OF DUE PRO-
CESS OF LAW IN THE CONDUCT OF A 
LINEUP DEPENDS UPON THE TOTALITY 
OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUND-
ING THE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION. 
WHERE THE EYEWITNESS HAD AN IN-
DEPENDENT BASIS FOR MAKING THE 
IDENTIFICATION, THE DEFENDANT-AP-
PELLANT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PRO-
CESS OF LAW EVEN THOUGH HE WAS 
THE ONLY SUSPECT IN THE LINEUP 
WITH SCARS ON HIS ARMS. 
The appellant contends that the lineup at which he 
was identified was basically unfair and implanted in the 
mind of the state's witness that the defendant was the 
same pemon as the suspect who entered Red Tull's Ameri-
can Service. To support his allegation that the lineup 
procedures were inherently suggestive, the appellant 
points to the fact that he was the only individual in the 
lineup with scars on his arm. The victim of the crime, 
Richard M. Lambert, had stated that the offender had 
scars on his right arm. 
From the testimony of the identifying witness, Rich-
ard M. Lambert, at the hearing on the defendant's motion 
to suppress lineup evidence and later at trial it is clear 
that Lambert identified the defendant at the lineup prior 
to and notice of and apart from the scars on the defen-
dant's arm. Lambert testified that no observation of the 
scars on the defendant's arm was made until after a posi-
tive identification had been made in his mind. He further 
testified that the identification was made on the basis of 
vcice identification and general features of the defendant. 
(Transcript of hearing 9-10, Transcript of trial 9-10.) 
Lambert's identification of the defendant was confident 
and unequivocal and did not depend to any degree upon 
the allegedly suggestive circumstances of the identifica-
tion procedure. 
The standard for determining the illegality of an 
identification elicited during a pretrial confrontation is 
set forth in United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967), 
and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293 (1967). In these cases 
the United States Supreme Court observed that a pretrial 
confrontation will constitute a ground for reversal of the 
conviction where, depending upon the totality of the cir-
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cumstances surrounding the confrontation, it " ... was 
so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable 
mistaken identification that [defendant] was denied due 
process of law." Stovall, supra, at 302. 
The language in both Wade and Stovall indicates 
that, in considering the totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding any pretrial identification, the presence of cer-
tain other facts in the totality may serve either to justify 
an improperly conducted identification or to avoid the 
presumption that the defendant has been prejudiced by 
the allegedly suggestive confrontation. For example, 
where factors external to the confrontation itself tend to 
prove that the witness's identification was accurate and 
hence not prejudicial to the defendant, courts have up-
held the use of identification procedures which arguably 
could be regarded as suggestive. See, e.g., United States, 
ex rel. Rutherford v. Deegan, 406 F. 2d 217 (2d Cir. 1969); 
Cline v. United States, 395 F. 2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968); 
Hanks v. United States, 388 F. 2d 171 (10th Cir. 1968). 
In the Rutherford case, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals evaluated the accuracy of an identification re-
sulting from an allegedly suggestive pretrial confronta-
tion. The witness whose cleaning establishment had been 
robbed was called to the police station to examine a sus-
pect. At the station house the witness viewed the de-
fendant, a Negro, in a room with several white detectives 
by means of a one-way mirror, and immediately identified 
him as the criminal. Holding that the identification of 
the defendant was probably accurate, regardless of the 
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prejudicial nature of the confrontation, Judge Medina 
placed great emphasis on the fact that the witness had 
for some five minutes closely watched the two men who 
had committed the robbery, making a deliberate attempt 
to study the face of the man who rifled her pocketbook. 
This approach to the totality test adopted by the 
Second Circuit has support in two Supreme Court deci-
sions since Stovall. In Simmons v. United States, 390 
U. S. 377 (1968), the Court validated a photographic 
showup relying, at least in part, upon its belief that there 
was little chance that a misidentification had taken place 
because the witness had an excellent opportunity to ob-
serve the suspects during the robbery. In Biggers v. Ten-
nessee, 390 U. S. 404 (1968), the Court, splitting four-to-
four, affirmed per curiam a conviction resting upon a 
showup identification. Significantly, Justice Douglas in 
his dissent considered factors similar to those weighed by 
the courts in both Rutherford and Simmons, although he 
reasoned that, on the facts of the case, the accuracy of 
the identification was in doubt and, therefore, the con-
frontation violated due process. 
In Thurman v. State, 262 N. E. 2d 635 (Ind. 1970), 
the Indiana Supreme Court observed that the resolution 
of whether identification procedures are unduly sugges-
tive or conducive to irreparable mistaken identity is best 
accomplished by a hearing in the trial court, for it is there 
that an exploration of the circumstances surrounding the 
confrontation can be accomplished. On this basis, the 
court upheld the identification and conviction of a Negro 
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defendant who had been the only individual in an all 
Negro lineup with an "Afro" haircut where it was shown 
that the witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the 
defendant during the commission of the crime. Paren-
thetically it should be noted that each of the witnesses 
had earlier told police investigators that the suspect wore 
his hair in the "Afro" style. 
The facts of the instant case demonstrate that a care-
ful examination of the totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding the identification yields the conclusion that Mr. 
Lambert identified the defendant without depending upon 
the allegedly suggestive circumstances surrounding the 
identification procedure. This is not a case where the 
witness's identification of the suspect is based upon a fleet-
ing glance of the suspect as in People v. Caruso, 68 Cal. 
2d 183, 436 P. 2d 336 (1968) (cited at page 6 of the ap-
pellant's brief). On the contrary, Lambert was the victim 
of the crime. He was held at gunpoint by the suspect for 
approximately ten to fifteen minutes in an area of excel-
lent lighting, and as the witnesses in Rutherford, Sim-
mons, Biggers, and Thurman, Lambert had ample oppor-
tunity to observe the defendant during the commission 
of the crime. 
The respondent does not seriously contest the appel-
lant's contention that situations may arise in which a sus-
pect is the only individual in a police lineup with dis-
tinguishing features or characteristics. Nor does the re-
spondent argue that such features or characteristics may 
have some suggestive impact upon the witnesses who are 
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present for purposes of identification. For example, in 
State v. Ervin, 22 Utah 2d 216, 451 P. 2d 372 (1969), this 
Court decried the manipulation of police lineups so as to 
be unduly suggestive of identification. However, implicit 
in this statement is the Utah Supreme Court's recogni-
tion that the element of suggestability cannot be removed 
completely from lineup procedures. Indeed, the Court ob-
served that the lineup procedure should not be "so laden 
with difficulties nor burdened with super-cautions as to 
make [lineups] impractical as a method of identifying 
the guilty." 22 Utah 2d at 221. 
Two recent decisions by the Utah Supreme Court 
further support the respondent's position that even grant-
ing that the lineup procedures suggested which individual 
the witness would identify, the identification is not tainted 
where there exists another basis for the identification. In 
State v. Vasquez, 22 Utah 2d 277, 451 P. 2d 786 (1969), 
the in-court identification of the defendant was permitted 
where the witness had an independent basis for making 
the identification even though the defendant had been 
denied counsel at the lineup. Similarly, this Court re-
jected the appellant's argument in State v. Jordan, 26 
Utah 2d 240, 487 P. 2d 1281 (1971), holding that any 
irregularities in the positive identification of the defen-
dant by eyewitnesses could not have resulted in any sub-
stantial prejudice to the defendant and did not deny him 
due process where the witnesses had other bases for mak-
ing the identification. 
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The Wade· decision outlined in detail the reasons why 
lineups are peculiarly susceptible to prejudicial suggestion 
on the part of the police officers and held that the Sixth 
Amendment required counsel's presence at such confron-
tations. The Court reasoned that the presence of counsel 
\Vas necessary not only to preserve meaningful crossex-
arnination at trial, but also to enable counsel to deter the 
police from unnecessarily suggesting a suspect's guilt or 
to correct any situation in which he detected potential 
prejudice to his client. 
In the instant case it should be emphasized that 
counsel was appointed and was present at all times dur-
ing the lineup confrontation and made no objection at 
any time as to the composition of the lineup. The appel-
lant in his brief emphasizes in great detail the testimony 
of Mr. Jay Edmonds regarding alleged events which the 
appellant contends made the lineup unfair. (Appellant's 
brief at 7-8). However, there was ample testimony con-
tradicting Mr. Edmonds' description of the lineup, thus 
presenting an issue of fact to be decided by the jury. 
Detective \V arran John Peck, who conducted the lineup, 
testified that: 
1. There was nothing that set the other par-
ticipants apart from the suspect. That is to say, 
none of the participants was particularly jovial or 
amused with the proceedings (T. 18). 
2. Nor was there anything about the sus-
pect's demeanor which would suggest that he was 
extremely nervous or scared (T. 18). 
3. The lineup was a representative lineup, 
the physical description of the defendant being 
matched as closely as possible (T. 16). 
The admissibility of the lineup identification was 
ruled upon at a hearing upon the defendant's motion to 
suppress lineup evidence and the determination of the 
trial court should not be disturbed unless it appears that 
the court was clearly in error. State v. Perry, No. 12611 
(Utah Jan. 17, 1972). 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent respectfully submits that the lineup 
was representative and conducted in a manner which 
would not unduly suggest the identity of the suspect. The 
respondent further submits that even granting that the 
identification procedure was suggestive, the resulting iden-
tification was not tainted since the identifying witness 
had an independent basis upon which to form his identi-
fication and that such identification was a genuine prod-
uct of the knowledge and recollection of the witness. 
The respondent therefore prays this Honorable Court 
to affirm the conviction of the defendant for the crime 
of robbery. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
